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Abstract
In Europe, neither unemployment rates nor institutions are uniform. In the EMU, countries have
coordinated their monetary policy, and ﬁscal policy might follow. Does convergence in ﬁscal policy
imply that unemployment rates will converge, too, or is diversiﬁed ﬁscal policy desirable? An
answer to this question requires insight into the dependence on ﬁscal policy of the unemployment
rate in equilibrium. This study estimates the equilibrium rate of unemployment and shows that it
has been affected signiﬁcantly by taxes and beneﬁts. Uniform ﬁscal policy would not, however,
harmonise the unemployment rates because the impact of policy varies widely across the OECD
economies.
a The author would like to thank Peter Broer, Nick Draper, Casper van Ewijk, Joeri Gorter, Fre Huizinga, Alex
Lammertsma and Theo van de Klundert for useful comments, and Paul de Jongh for statistical assistance. The research
has been ﬁnancially supported by the European Commission.1 Introduction
Though the OECD economies, and in particular the West-European economies, are highly
interdependent, their economies behave differently. Differences in the level and development of
the unemployment rate are important, both from a macroeconomic and a policy point of view. In
Europe, the unemployment rate in 2000 varies between 3% in the Netherlands and 14% in Spain.
Moreover, the development of the unemployment rate in the past decades had shown marked
differences, showing a large increase in Spain, but a rather stable pattern in the United States.
In this paper, we attempt to explain these persistent differences in the unemployment rates
from an equilibrium point of view. We estimate the equilibrium rate of unemployment for six
OECD economies. Fluctuations in this equilibrium rate can be explained from ﬂuctuations in the
tax wedge, the replacement rate, the minimum wage rate and the user cost of capital. This
dependence of the equilibrium rate of unemployment on several policy variables suggests that
governments can inﬂuence the unemployment rate.
In the multi-country context of this paper, we will investigate not only whether
unemployment might in equilibrium depend on ﬁscal policy, but also whether the link between
ﬁscal policy and the unemployment rate is uniform across the six OECD economies in our
sample.1 We investigate whether differences in the response of the equilibrium rate of
unemployment to ﬁscal policy contributes to the explanation of persistent variation in
unemployment rates between countries in past decades. A conﬁrmative conclusion implies that
future reforms of ﬁscal policy should take into account the country-speciﬁc impact of
institutional changes on unemployment. In the debate surrounding the design of ﬁscal policy in a
monetary union, insight into the responsiveness of the member economies to ﬁscal shocks will
be indispensable.2
There are several explanations for the dependence of the unemployment on ﬁscal policy.3
First, Friedman (1968) argues that monetary policy in the long run affects only nominal
variables. Real variables, like the unemployment rate, might be inﬂuenced in the short run, but
then return to their natural rates in the long run. In the long run, real variables depend on real
factors only. The question then arises, what are the real factors? Does ﬁscal policy permanently
affect the real economy? Theories in which this relationship exists generally include imperfect
wage formation, see Pissarides (1998). One example is the theory of search frictions on the
labour market, where workers and ﬁrms have the opportunity to negotiate the wage rate. Policy
1 The sample consists of Germany, France, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States.
2 See Beetsma et al. (2001) for a survey of the literature on ﬁscal policy coordination in a monetary union.
3 A prominent stream of empirical literature on the equilibrium rate of unemployment focuses on the relation between
inﬂation and unemployment and tries to ﬁnd the rate of unemployment at which inﬂation is stable, see Gordon (1997), and
Richardson et al. (2000). This type of empirical literature is, however, unable to detect the causes of equilibrium
unemployment.
2affecting the relative positions of workers or ﬁrms might affect unemployment in the long run.
Alternatively, the theory of efﬁciency wages assumes that ﬁrms set wages above the
market-clearing level to induce high effort by workers. This paper adopts a third alternative, in
which unions are assumed to negotiate the wage rate, which results in a wage rate exceeding the
market-clearing level, which then creates unemployment.4 This approach, known as the
monopoly union approach, was introduced by Leontief (1946) and popularised by Layard et al.
(1991).
In the negotiations, unions take into account the net wage rate and the fallback position of
workers. Both can be inﬂuenced by ﬁscal policy or economic conditions. The economic
condition relevant in the negotiations is the unemployment rate, because unions take into
account the fact that a high wage rate might reduce the demand for labour, which implies that a
fraction of the union members might become unemployed. Three types of ﬁscal policy are
distinguished in the paper. The replacement rate, which is inﬂuenced by the government’s
decisions on the generosity of the social security system, affects the fallback position of workers
in the wage negotiations. An improvement in this fallback position reduces the income reduction
of becoming unemployed and pushes the wage rate upward. Besides the unemployment beneﬁts,
the fallback position might also be affected by changes in the minimum wage rate. The third
policy variable that might affect the wage rate is the wedge. This variable is important if taxes
affect labour income and the alternative sources of income differently.
Empirical support for the relationship between the wage rate and the unemployment rate is
provided by Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1994) and Blanchard and Katz (1997), among others.
The support is strong for European economies, but the wage level relation is often rejected for
the United States, see Blanchard and Katz (1999). This support for the existence of a wage curve
implies that the key prediction of the monopoly union model is not rejected empirically.
Evidence for the inﬂuence of taxes and the replacement rate on the wage rate can be found in
Graaﬂand and Huizinga (1999). With respect to the replacement rate, they conclude that the
empirical evidence is scarce and mixed. The relation between the tax wedge and the wage rate is
more robust, but the estimates vary widely. The question whether the differences across
countries are institutional or due to the use of different data sources and various theories cannot
be answered with a survey of the available evidence. A contribution of this paper is to estimate
the relation between wages, unemployment and ﬁscal policy for six OECD economies in a
uniform framework.
Labour demand by ﬁrms implies a second relation between wages and employment – in fact
4 The fact that workers and unions do not negotiate employment makes this approach inefﬁcient, cf. McDonald and Solow
(1981), but we adopt it because "explicit simultaneous bargaining on wages and employment is most unusual" (Teulings
and Hartog, 1998, p144). One of the reasons why ﬁrms and unions do not negotiate the employment level is that ﬁrms
continuously adjust their employment level via hiring and ﬁring. Continuous negotiations on the employment level would
therefore be very costly, see Nickell (1990).
3a negative relationship. In reaction to an increase in their wage costs, ﬁrms reduce their
employment level if their production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale. A crucial
parameter in this labour demand relation is the elasticity of substitution between labour and
capital, which measures the sensitivity of labour demand to relative changes in the price of
labour. This relative price, in turn, depends on the price level of alternative inputs such as capital.
In equilibrium, the wage curve and the labour-demand equation determine the wage rate and
the unemployment rate. This equilibrium rate of unemployment therefore depends on the
determinants of both curves, like the wedge, the replacement rate, the minimum wage rate and
the cost of capital. An important spin-off in this paper is to measure the equilibrium rate of
unemployment and show how it depends on the structural determinants. Key questions are
whether the structural approach can provide reliable estimates of the equilibrium rate of
unemployment and whether dependence on the structural determinants is uniform across the
OECD economies. Broer et al. (2000) showed that these factors are important determinants of
equilibrium unemployment in the Netherlands. We investigate whether this also holds for
Germany, France, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. Nickell (1998) and
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) show in cross-section and panel-analyses that the replacement
rate and taxes, among others, contribute signiﬁcantly to unemployment in the OECD. However,
they do not provide country-speciﬁc evidence and are therefore unable to answer the question
which institutions are important in which country. Country-speciﬁc evidence is provided by
Bean et al. (1986), who show that taxes contributed signiﬁcantly to unemployment in the United
States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, but hardly in Germany and France. We deviate
from Bean et al. (1986) by adding the replacement rate and capital costs as explanations for the
equilibrium rate of unemployment, in a different framework. This theoretical model is described
in section 2. The empirical results are shown in section 3.
42 The model
We develop a small structural model for the labour market. Key relations of this model are the
wage equation and the labour demand curve. The wage equation is an extension of Layard et al.
(1991), which has also been adopted by Broer et al. (2000), whereas labour demand stems from
cost minimisation by ﬁrms. From both equations, the equilibrium rate of unemployment follows.
2.1 The wage equation
Unions and ﬁrms are the dominant players on the labour market. We assume that ﬁrms can set
the employment level, whereas unions and ﬁrms negotiate the wage rate. Unions represent the
workers and aim at maximising the surplus of work SW over the income from alternatives:
SW =
wN
pc
− λ ξ
wN
pc
− (1−λ) [ρ
wN
pc
+ γ
w
py
] − λ (1−ξ)
wN
min
pc
, (2.1)
wN = w(1+te)−1(1−td), wN
min = wmin(1+te)−1(1−td).
The return to employment is the net real wage income of workers, which is the gross wage rate
w(1+te)−1 deﬂated by the consumer price pc, and corrected for taxes and premiums, where te
and td are taxes and premiums paid by employers and employees, respectively.
The alternatives to work for unions consist of several parts, which are weighted with the
probability λ that a worker ﬁnds another job and with the probability (1−ξ) that this new job is
in a sector with a minimum wage. The ﬁrst alternative for workers is to ﬁnd another job with
probability λξ. If workers and unions bargain over the wage, the results do not cover all ﬁrms
and unions. Consider the case where workers push up the wage rate, with the consequence that
ﬁrms do not hire all of the union’s workers. Here, the option of accepting a job not covered by
the negotiations becomes relevant. It is plausible that the probability of getting another job λ
depends on the unemployment rate u, so λ = λ(u).
The second alternative is beneﬁt income that workers might receive if they remain or become
unemployed. Beneﬁts are linked to the gross wage rate, and are generally taxed. This implies
that the net-replacement rate ρ might enter the solution for the negotiated wage rate.
Thirdly, home production might generate income for unemployed workers. We assume that
the productivity at home is limited, such that the return to home production is a fraction γ of the
wage rate. Home production is not subject to indirect taxes, which implies that the return to
home production must be deﬂated by the value-added price py. An advantage of home
production is that it is free of taxation. If taxes or premiums are increased, then workers’ net
returns to employment falls, but the return to home production is unaffected. The assumption
about home production therefore introduces the wedge as a determinant of the wage rate,
5independent of the net-replacement rate.1
Finally, the negotiated wage rate might depend on the minimum wage wmin. The most
obvious reason a minimum wage might affect the wage rate is that low-productive workers
become unemployed. The increase in unemployment tempers the wage rate, but the higher
average productivity level might push the average wage rate up. Alternatively, if minimum wage
jobs are not covered by unions, they might be part of the fallback of workers in the negotiations,
where we assume that unemployed workers have a possibility ξ of being hired in the
minimum-wage sector. An improvement in this fallback option might raise the negotiated wage
rate. This alternative reason provides an impact from the minimum wage rate, independent of
labour productivity and unemployment.
Firms aim at hiring labour to maximise proﬁts. We assume that the single alternative to ﬁrms
is to close the vacancy. The surplus of the ﬁrm SF in the negotiations with a single worker can
therefore be written as:
SF = pyh−w, (2.2)
where h is labour productivity. In the right-to-manage model of the labour market, workers and
ﬁrms share their surpluses by negotiating the wage rate. The level of employment is not part of
the bargaining process, but is determined by ﬁrms. However, the labour demand function of
ﬁrms is known by both ﬁrms and unions, and is taken into account in the negotiations.
In the appendix we show that maximising the generalised Nash product of the surpluses of
unions and ﬁrms leads to a nonlinear wage equation.2 This wage equation can be linearized to:
ln w = ln py +ln h + χ1 ln L + χ2 ln ρ + χ3 ln
wmin
w
− χ4u + χ0 . (2.3)
where L is the wedge between gross wage costs and net wage income.3 The wage equation is
deﬁned in real terms, because both workers and ﬁrms are interested in the real return to
employment. Labour productivity enters the wage equation with a unit coefﬁcient, which
implies that workers beneﬁt from an increase in the productivity of labour. The wedge between
labour costs and the net wage rate enters the wage curve because unions trade off employment
versus home-production. A wedge coefﬁcient between zero and unity implies that an increase in
taxes is borne partly by workers and partly by ﬁrms. An increase in the replacement rate or the
minimum wage rate reduces the difference between wage income and the alternatives. This
1 An untaxed source of income (or welfare) is necessary for the wedge to affect the wage rate. The untaxed source of
income we opt for is home production. Alternatively, welfare from leisure might be introduced as the untaxed source of
welfare. In contrast, beneﬁts are generally taxed, such that an increase in taxes raises both labour income and beneﬁt
income equivalently, leaving the wage rate unaffected. Graaﬂand and Huizinga (1999) show that in the empirical literature
the wage rate depends on both the wedge and the replacement rate.
2 See Graaﬂand and Huizinga (1999) for the derivation and estimation (for the Netherlands) of a similar non-linear wage
equation.
3 The wedge is deﬁned as L = wy/wc, where wy = w/py and wc = wN/pc, which implies that L =
pc(1+te)
py(1−td).
6improves the bargaining position of unions, allowing them to negotiate a higher wage rate.
Finally, the unemployment rate enters the wage curve for two reasons. First, it affects the
probability that a ﬁred worker can ﬁnd a job in another ﬁrm. In addition, it measures the fraction
of workers receiving unemployment beneﬁts.
2.2 Labour demand equation
Firms use labour and capital in the production process. The demand for these inputs is
determined by minimisation of costs. We assume that technological progress is labour
augmenting, which implies that the production of a unit of output requires a diminishing amount
of labour over time. Measured in efﬁciency units, however, the shares of labour and capital are
assumed to be ﬁxed. Adopting a CES-cost function, the costs per unit of output are:
c =

θ p1−σ
l + (1−θ)p1−σ
k
 1
1−σ , pl =
w
pl0 eγ1t + γ2t2 , (2.4)
where θ is the labour share, σ is the substitution elasticity between labour and capital, pk is the
user cost of capital, pl0 is pl in the base year, and γ1t +γ2t2 is a proxy for the laboursaving
technological progress. The demand for labour follows from the minimisation of total costs,
which is the cost per unit of output c times output y, with respect to the level of employment l:
ln l = ln θ + ln y − σ ln
pl
c

− γ1t − γ2t2 . (2.5)
In the base year, where t = 0 and prices and costs equal unity, the parameter θ is equal to the
labour income share. Over time, the labour income share can vary only if the substitution
elasticity σ is unequal to unity. Countries with large variability in the labour income share likely
have a low elasticity of substitution, and vice versa. In estimating equation (2.5) we will assume
that marginal costs are equal to the value added price: c = py.
2.3 Equilibrium rate of unemployment
The wage equation (2.3) and the labour demand equation (2.5) can both be written in terms of
the labour income share. Equation (2.3) shows the labour income share that follows from the
wage negotiations. Equation (2.5) represents the optimal labour income share for ﬁrms operating
on a perfectly competitive goods market. In equilibrium, both expressions for the labour income
share must be consistent.4 This implies that, in equilibrium, unemployment must equal
u∗ =
1
χ 4
"
χ1ln L + χ2ln ρ + χ3ln
wmin
w
− ln
 
1 − (1−θ)

pk
py
(1−σ)!
+ χ0
#
(2.6)
where u∗ denotes equilibrium unemployment. This expression shows four determinants of the
equilibrium rate of unemployment: the wedge, the replacement rate, the minimum wage rate and
4 Draper and Huizinga (2000) elaborate on the equilibrium labour income share.
7relative capital costs. The wedge may shift because of changes in tax rates or because of a
change in the terms of trade. An increase in the wedge and the replacement rate push up wage
demand and, ceteris paribus, lead to an increase in the labour income share if σ<1. However,
the labour income share consistent with ﬁrm price and employment setting has not changed. To
maintain equilibrium, the unemployment rate has to rise. An increase in the markup and the
relative user cost of capital reduces the labour income share consistent with ﬁrm price and
employment setting. Thus, the labour income share that results from the wage bargaining must
also fall. To bring this about, the unemployment rate has to rise.
The degree to which the relative labour price or the user cost of capital affects equilibrium
unemployment depends on the elasticity of substitution. A rise in the relative cost of capital
always reduces the real wage the ﬁrm can pay and still maintain its level of proﬁtability. This
follows directly from the factor price frontier. The issue is how the unions will be induced to
accept this wage cut. Without substitution, the standard mechanism of layoffs and
unemployment is obtained. If there is scope for substitution, ﬁrms will also respond by reducing
the capital/labour ratio, which over time reduces labour productivity. Since lower productivity
directly reduces union wage demand, there is less need for unemployment to rise here. With a
Cobb Douglas technology, the reduction in labour productivity exactly matches the reduction in
the real wage the ﬁrm can pay. Union wage demands then also exactly match this wage
reduction, and there is no need at all for increased unemployment.
The impact of the elasticity of substitution is an important difference with other recent labour
market theories, where we do not presuppose a substitution elasticity of 1 (as, for instance
Layard et al. (1991) and Blanchard and Katz (1997)). Available empirical evidence for the
Netherlands does not generally point to an elasticity of substitution close to unity, cf. Broer et al.
(2000), and the estimates in this paper conﬁrm these ﬁndings. Blanchard (1997) ﬁnds much
higher elasticities of substitution. However, he estimates the elasticity of complementarity (the
inverse of the substitution elasticity). This yields an upwardly biassed estimate of the elasticity
of substitution, see Hamermesh (1993).
A second important difference with the literature is the absence of labour productivity as an
explanation of the equilibrium rate of unemployment. Ball and Mankiw (2002) state that the
most promising hypothesis is that the decline in the NAIRU (in the 90s) is attributable to the
acceleration in productivity growth. In our framework, labour productivity does not affect the
equilibrium rate of unemployment because in our model the wage elasticity of labour
productivity equals one in equation (3), and the output elasticity in equation (5) equals one, as
well. Whether these restrictions are valid is an empirical issue to which we return in the next
section.
82.4 Data
To give an impression of the labour market developments in the countries of our sample, we
present the series for the labour income share and the rate of unemployment in ﬁgure 2.1.5 The
labour income share is interesting because it will be constant only if the substitution elasticity is
equal to one. In the wage equation, the labour income share is linked to the rate of
unemployment, among other determinants, and the graphs of both variables may provide a ﬁrst
indication whether a negative relation might exist between the level of the labour income share
(or the level of the wage rate) and the level of unemployment.
The graphs of the labour income share show that this share is quite stable in Germany, the
United Kingdom and the United States, whereas it shows large ﬂuctuations in the Netherlands
and Spain. The unemployment rate shows a distinct upward trend in the European economies,
with clear signs of unemployment reduction in the 1990s in the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom.
5 Details about the data sources are provided in the appendix.
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10Figure 2.1 continued: Labour income share and unemployment rate (1960-1998)
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113 Estimation results
The key equation of the model is the expression for the equilibrium rate of unemployment in
equation (6), where it is shown how it might depend on structural factors like the wedge, the
replacement rate and the relative price of capital. In this empirical section, the central question is
how much? How much is the equilibrium rate of unemployment inﬂuenced by the identiﬁed
structural factors? This question must be answered in two steps. First, the wage and
labour-demand equations are estimated. Next, we calculate the equilibrium rate of
unemployment from these equations and show how it depends on the structural factors.
The wage and employment equations were estimated for each country separately. In the
wage equation, different sets of exogenous variables were included because some variables were
not available (like the replacement rate for the United States) or do not exist (like the legal
minimum wage rate in Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States). In addition, the
minimum wage rate was not included in the wage equation for the Netherlands, because
minimum wages and the replacement rate are closely tied.
The estimation of the wage and employment equations can be considered as the ﬁrst step in
an error-correction estimation, see Engle and Granger (1987). The second step, the estimation of
the short-run dynamics, is less important for the main argument of this paper and is therefore
discussed in the appendix.
3.1 Wage equation
The wage equation is based on wage bargaining between unions and ﬁrms. Wage bargaining is
present in all countries of our sample, though at different levels and with different scope. In the
United States, most collective agreements are negotiated at the plant or employer level, see
Teulings and Hartog (1998). The coverage of these agreements is limited to the union members,
which are only a quarter of all workers. Siebert (1997) therefore concludes that wage formation
in the United States comes close to being a market process. This contrasts with most European
countries, where the coverage of wage negotiations is high: the wages of three-quarters of the
employees result from wage negotiations, see Layard et al. (1991).1 This is not primarily the
result of a much higher share of unionised workers in the European countries, but more
importantly due to the extension of collective agreements to non-union workers. In addition,
wages are often not determined at the ﬁrm level, but at the level of the industry or the economy,
see Siebert (1997).
The estimation results for the wage equation are summarised in Table 3.1. For each country,
the real wage rate was regressed on labour productivity, the wedge, lagged unemployment and a
1 Within our sample, the United Kingdom is an exception, where the coverage of collective agreements is less than 50%;
see OECD (1997).
12constant. In addition, the replacement rate, the minimum wage rate deﬂated by the product price,
and dummies were included for several countries. We show in the appendix that these variables
are integrated,2 which implies that the wage equation estimates should be treated as
co-integration relations. Therefore, a likelihood ratio test will be use to test the signiﬁcance of
the parameters.
Table 3.1 Wage equation estimates
Country Sample lnL lnRR ln(
wmin
py ) u(−1) χ0 DW DF
France 1970-1998 0 0.14 0.25 − 0.79 − 2.26 1.30 − 3.29
(-) (0.05) (0.05) (0.40) (0.39) (0.07)
Germany 1970-1994 0.73 0 − 2.10 − 1.06 1.55 − 4.76
(0.12) (-) (0.26) (0.05) (0.00)
The Netherlands 1970-1998 0.13 0.75 − 1.07 − 0.32 1.24 − 3.62
(0.06) (0.08) (0.23) (0.02) (0.03)
Spain 1971-1998 0.21 0.25 − 0.68 − 0.55 1.01 − 3.12
(0.11) (0.04) (0.11) (0.03) (0.10)
United Kingdom 1965-1998 0.20 0.05 − 0.79 − 0.42 1.02 − 3.56
(0.06) (0.02) (0.12) (0.03) (0.03)
United States 1969-1998 0 − 0.40 − 0.44 0.24 3.38
(-) (0.24) (0.02) (0.05)
Estimated equation: lnw = lnpy +lnh+χ1lnL+χ2lnρ +χ3ln(wmin/py)+χ4u +χ0
DW: Durbin-Watson statistic.
DF: Dickey-Fuller test for the stationarity of the residuals.
The second row for each estimation contains standard errors for the parameters and the p-values for the Dickey-Fuller test.
0: variable has been included, but appears to be insigniﬁcant, or wrongly signed and has therefore been restricted to zero.
Dummies:
For France, we have included a dummy for the periods 1980-1984 (coefﬁcient: 0.04) and 1989-1992 (coefﬁcient: − 0.03).
For Germany, we have included a dummy for the uniﬁcation period, 1991-1994 (coefﬁcient: − 0.07).
For Spain, we have included a dummy for the period, 1984-1985 (coefﬁcient: − 0.04).
The key result of the estimations of the wage equation is that the lagged rate of
unemployment reduces current wages. The size of the effect and the signiﬁcance varies between
countries. The effect of changes in the unemployment rate may be extremely important in
Germany, where an increase in the unemployment rate of 1%-point reduces the wage rate by
more than 2%.
The wedge between wage costs and net wages was not differentiated to its components but
was included as a single variable.3 This wedge turns out to affect the wage positively, excepting
France and the United States, where the wedge coefﬁcients are insigniﬁcant.4 The positive
2 In a few cases the unit-root test is unable to distinguish between a deterministic and stochastic unit root.
3 Tyrvainen (1995) concludes that ‘in eight out of ten countries, an hypothesis of identical long-run response to changes in
all relevant tax rates passed the test’ (p44). Among these eight countries are France and Germany.
4 The insigniﬁcant wedge term for France, which was in the estimations often negatively signed, might be caused by the
13wedge effect implies that households can shift part of their tax changes towards ﬁrms, and vice
versa.
The impact of the replacement rate is signiﬁcantly positive for the countries for which it is
available (except Germany). The effects of changes in the replacement rate are quite small for
France and the United Kingdom, and large for the Netherlands.5 In these three countries, an
increase in the replacement rate, which improves the fallback position of employees in the wage
negotiations, allows workers to negotiate a higher wage rate. A similar story holds for the
minimum wage rate, which can be another determinant of the fallback position of workers. In
the countries for which the minimum wage rate is included, the wage rate depends positively on
it. An exception is the Netherlands, where beneﬁts are tied to the minimum wage, which implies
that the minimum wage effect cannot be estimated independently from the replacement rate
effect.
We have included a few additive dummies in the estimations. The uniﬁcation dummy for
Germany was mentioned already, where uniﬁcation inﬂuenced West-German wages negatively.
When multiplied with the unemployment rate (not reported), the dummy implies that the rate of
unemployment has a stronger impact on the real wage rate after the uniﬁcation than before. A
similar observation was reported by Hansen (2000). The 1984-1985 dummy for Spain, a period
in which wages were low, reﬂects the efforts made in preparation of joining the European
community, see Blanchard and Jimeno (1995). The 1980-1984 dummy for France may point to
the exchange crisis of 1981-1983, where according to Sicsic and Wyplosz (1996) ‘an explicit
move against wage indexation was deemed necessary to bring inﬂation down’ (pp. 226-7).
Table 3.1 reports the Durbin-Watson statistic and the Dickey-Fuller statistic. Given that we
estimated long-run equations, the reported DW statistics do not point to serious serial correlation
in the wage equations for the European countries. In contrast, the DW statistic for the US is very
low, because the residuals of the wage equation are trended downwardly. This might be induced
by the restriction of the labour productivity coefﬁcient to unity, well above the unrestricted
estimation, see Table C.1. The Dickey-Fuller statistic for testing stationarity shows that the
residuals of each estimation are stationary, where it should be mentioned that the trend in the
unit-root test is signiﬁcant for the United States. The stationarity of the residuals is conﬁrmed by
the error-correction estimations for the six countries in the appendix, in Table C.2, where the
difference between the actual and equilibrium wage rate enters the short-run wage rate
negatively.
Finally, we restricted the price and labour productivity parameters in the wage equation.
extremely high correlation between the wedge and the unemployment rate. Estimation over a shorter period (1971-1990),
where the correlation is smaller, yields a positive wedge coefﬁcient.
5 Given these small effects, we cannot reject the conclusion by Bean (1994) that ‘the evidence for a major role for
unemployment beneﬁts on to wages seems weak’. The Netherlands might be an exception, though Broer et al. (2000)
report a lower coefﬁcient of 0.35 for the replacement rate in the Netherlands.
14Table C.1 in the appendix shows that the unrestricted estimation of these parameters is close to
one, with the exceptions of France and the United States, where responsiveness of the real wage
is respectively 0.55 and 0.83.
If we compare the estimates of the wage curve with (part of) the existing evidence, we ﬁnd
some interesting similarities and differences. Table 3.2 presents a survey of these results. In the
early 1990s, Drèze and Bean (1990) published a collection of papers, most of which included
wage-level estimations for nine European countries. Layard et al. (1991) estimated wage-level
equations and calculated the NAIRUs for most OECD countries. Tyrvainen (1995) estimated a
set of wage and labour demand equations; which he used for a few policy simulations, not for
the calculation of the equilibrium unemployment rate. For a similar purpose, Barrell and Dury
(2001) estimated the wage equation for 11 Euro countries. Finally, Morgan and Mourougane
(2002) used a panel of OECD countries to estimate a wage equation with institutional variables.
They observed signiﬁcant effects from mismatch and union density, but non−robust results for
the wedge and the replacement rate.
Others studies have linked the wage-growth to the wedge and the replacement. For example,
Bean et al. (1986) observes signiﬁcant wedge coefﬁcients for France and the United States, but
insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients for Germany (negative coefﬁcient), the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom.
A summary of these estimation results is presented in Table 3.2. In addition, we included a
few single-country studies. Clearly, if labour productivity is included in the wage equation, then
its coefﬁcient is restricted, generally to one. Though the wedge coefﬁcients should be interpreted
with care (because various studies might use different deﬁnitions), the table shows that in most
countries labour taxes are shared between workers and ﬁrms. Thirdly, in the few studies that
include the replacement rate, its effect on wages is positive, but uniformly less than 0.5. Our
estimated coefﬁcients for the replacement rate in France, Germany and Spain ﬁt in this picture,
but the coefﬁcient for the Netherlands is large. Finally, a high unemployment rate depresses
wages in all studies, but with different semi-elasticities. Any coefﬁcient between zero and four
can be found, and our variety of coefﬁcients ﬁts nicely in this picture. More speciﬁcally, the
larger coefﬁcient for Germany in our sample corresponds with the literature.
Summarising, the estimated equations represent the data well, excepting France and the
United States. The weaknesses of the wage equation for France are the inclusion of two
dummies and the low coefﬁcient for labour productivity in the unrestricted estimation.
Nevertheless, the restricted equations for France ﬁt the data quite well, and can therefore be used
for the calculation of the equilibrium rate of unemployment. The residuals of the wage equation
for the United States are clearly trended and can therefore not be viewed as a good
representation of the US wage determination.
The fact that the unemployment rate reduces the wage rate for all countries implies that the
wage negotiation model can be maintained for the European economies in the sample. This is in
15Table 3.2 Wage equations in the literature
lny −lnl L RR u lnu
France
Barrell and Dury (2001) 1.0∗ − 1.06
Layard et al. (1991) − 2.22
Tyrvainen (1995) 1.0∗ 0.42 − 0.29
Germany
Barrell and Dury (2001) 1.0∗ − 3.59
Entorf et al. (1990) 1.0∗ − 2.20∗
Layard et al. (1991) − 0.55
Tyrvainen (1995) 1.0∗ 1.0 − 0.17
The Netherlands
Barrell and Dury (2001) 1.0∗ − 1.64
Broer et al. (2000) 1.0∗ 0.28 0.29 1.76
Layard et al. (1991) − 0.66
Lever (1991)a 1.0∗ 0.76 0.17 − 1.49
Spain
Andrés et al. (1990)b 0.8∗ 1.0∗ − 1.06
Barrell and Dury (2001) − 0.65
Dolado et al. (1986)b 1.08 1.0 0.45 − 3.02
Layard et al. (1991) − 0.17
United Kingdom
Barrell and Dury (2001) 1.0∗ − 2.06
Layard et al. (1991) − 0.98
Layard and Nickell (1986)b 1.07 0.16 0.14 − 2.47
Tyrvainen (1995) 1.0∗ 0.3 − 0.10
United States
Layard et al. (1991) − 0.32
Tyrvainen (1995) 1.0∗ 0.0∗ − 0.05
Dependent variable in all equations is the real wage rate (ln w - ln py).
∗: restricted coefﬁcient.
a: Lever (1991) estimates separate wedge terms; we report the estimated coefﬁcient for the employers’ social security contribution rate.
b: Andrés et al. (1990), Dolado et al. (1986) and Layard and Nickell (1986) include the capital-labour force ratio instead of labour
productivity.
Tyrvainen (1995) does not make clear which parameters are estimated and which are restricted. He states, however, that the restrictions
are data consistent.
16line with the empirical evidence summarised in Table 3.2. It also conﬁrms the conclusion of
Blanchard and Katz (1999), that a wage-level equation can be estimated for European
economies, but not for the United States.
3.2 Labour demand equation
Table 3.3 shows the results of regressions in which employment was regressed on output and the
relative price of labour, see equation (2.5). The output coefﬁcient was restricted to unity, where
unrestricted estimations do not differ signiﬁcantly from unity, see Table C.1.
Table 3.3 Labour demand equation estimates
Country Sample σ θ t t2 DW DF
France 1970-1998 0.12 0.61 0.01 − 0.003 0.88 − 4.35
(0.08) (0.002) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.00)
Germany 1962-1994 0.48 0.44 0.02 0 1.13 − 3.42
(0.06) (0.001) (0.001) (-) (0.05)
The Netherlands 1970-1998 0.33 0.57 0.01 − 0.004 1.09 − 3.60
(0.06) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.03)
Spain 1971-1998 0.27 0.55 0.01 − 0.001 0.71 − 3.68
(0.06) (0.003) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.02)
United Kingdom 1965-1998 0.67 0.63 0.02 0 0.89 − 5.06
(0.09) (0.003) (0.002) (-) (0.00)
United States 1969-1998 0.92 0.61 0.04 1.45 − 3.34
(0.13) (0.002) (0.04) (0.06)
Estimated equation: lnl = lnθ +lny −σ(lnw −lnpy)−σ(γ1t +γ2t2)
See explanation of Table 3.1.
For France, we included a dummy for the period 1988-1992 (coefﬁcient: −0.02).
The main message of the estimated labour demand equations in Table 3.3 is that the
substitution elasticity between labour and capital lies uniformly between zero and one. Only in
the case of France does the elasticity not differ signiﬁcantly from zero. Germany, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, however, have high elasticities of substitution, which is in line
with their relatively ﬂat curve for the labour income share.
The normalisation of the wage rate and the GDP deﬂator to one in the base year (generally
1995) implies that the constant term of the labour demand equation matches the labour income
share in that year. Therefore, it is not surprising that θ shows up signiﬁcantly for every country.
The signiﬁcant coefﬁcients for the trend and its square (in most countries) show that
technological progress increases the demand for labour, though at a decreasing rate.
The test-statistics show that serial correlation is not a severe problem in the labour demand
equations and that the residuals of the labour demand equations are stationary. The stationarity
17of the residuals is conﬁrmed by the error-correction estimations in Table C.3 of the appendix.
Finally, we tested whether the unit restriction on the output coefﬁcient is valid. Table C.1 in the
appendix shows that unrestricted estimates of this coefﬁcient are not signiﬁcantly different from
unity.6
The empirical observation that the elasticities of substitution are less than unity corresponds
with the empirical literature, of which three papers will be cited. First, Rowthorn (1999) surveys
the literature on substitution elasticities and shows that the median of the estimates is 0.58, and
in only seven of 33 cases the estimated coefﬁcient exceeds 0.8. Most of his sample consists of
empirical studies for the United States or the United Kingdom. The single multi-country study
they include is Drazen et al. (1984), with a substitution elasticity of 0.21 for ten OECD
countries. Second, Drèze and Bean (1990) include several country-speciﬁc studies on the labour
market, and their estimates are less than unity for France, Germany and Spain, but exceed unity
for the United Kingdom and the United States. Finally, Blanchard (1997) regresses the
labour-capital share on the real wage rate for a panel of 15 OECD-countries and concludes that,
assuming an average capital share of 0.35, the implied elasticity of substitution is a little under
1.0. In the simulations, Blanchard uses a substitution elasticity of either 1.0 or 2.0.
Summarising, the long-run labour demand equations ﬁt the data reasonably well. The
substitution elasticities vary between zero and one and are relatively high for Germany, the
United Kingdom and the United States.
3.3 The equilibrium rate of unemployment
Given the long-run wage and labour demand equations, we use equation (11) to calculate the
equilibrium rate of unemployment. This is by deﬁnition the unemployment rate at which both
the wage rate and employment are at their equilibrium levels. An unemployment rate exceeding
its equilibrium level reduces wage growth, because the parameters on unemployment in Table
3.1 are negative. This stimulates the demand for labour and reduces in turn the level of
unemployment. Therefore, u∗ in equation (11) can be considered as a stable equilibrium relation
only if both the wage level and employment level equations, estimated in Table 3.1 and 3.3
respectively, can be considered as such.
Given that the unemployment rate enters the wage-level equation signiﬁcantly for all
countries, u∗ can in principle be calculated for all countries, too. However, the wage-level
equation for the United States is highly unreliable, leaving upwardly trending residuals, which
makes the interpretation of u∗ as the equilibrium unemployment rate rather problematic. The
next graphs show the equilibrium and actual unemployment rates for all countries except the
6 Because the unit coefﬁcient on labour productivity also holds for the wage equation (with the possible exception of
France), the hypothesis that labour productivity is a signiﬁcant determinant of the equilibrium rate of unemployment has to
be rejected. See Ball and Mankiw (2002) for the opposite view.
18United States.
Fluctuations in the equilibrium unemployment rates stem from ﬂuctuations in the wedge, the
replacement rate and capital costs, see equation (11).7 The decomposition of the equilibrium
unemployment rate in its components is shown in the right-hand side graphs of each country.
The decomposition of equilibrium unemployment into its factors differs between countries for
two reasons. First, the sizes of the shocks might differ (e.g. because some governments reduce
the beneﬁts whereas others do not). Second, the dependability of the equilibrium unemployment
rate on shocks depends on the institutions in each economy, which are reﬂected in the estimated
coefﬁcients for the wage and labour-demand equations. For example, a given reduction in the
replacement rate implies, according to our model, a much sharper reduction in the equilibrium
unemployment rate in the Netherlands than in the United Kingdom. This might reﬂect the more
centralised and widespread wage negotiations by unions in the Netherlands. Similar
decompositions to the shocks and institutions can be found by Bean (1994) and Blanchard
(1999).
7 The capital costs in the graphs were approximated by the relative price of labour w/py.
19Figure 3.1 Equilibrium unemployment and its structural determinants
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21The equilibrium unemployment rate in France is mainly determined by the relative capital
costs and the minimum wage rate. In the period 1970 - 1985, the increase in the minimum wage
rate and the reduction in the capital costs offset each other. From 1985 onwards, the increase in
the costs of capital pushed the equilibrium unemployment rate upwards. In Germany,
ﬂuctuations in the equilibrium unemployment are strongly related to ﬂuctuations in the wedge,
which of course stems from the high wedge coefﬁcient in the wage equation, see Table 3.1. In
addition, the uniﬁcation had a strong negative impact on the equilibrium rate of unemployment.
The replacement rate, which started to decline around 1980, is a key determinant of the
reduction of the equilibrium unemployment rate in the Netherlands. The second important
determinant is the relative cost of capital, which initially tempers the growth in the equilibrium
unemployment rate, but pushed it signiﬁcantly upward in the period 1980-1985.8 In Spain, all
factors contributed to the rising level of the equilibrium unemployment rate: the wedge
increased strongly between 1965 and 1997, as the sum of taxes and premiums as a share of GDP
rose from 20% to 45% in this period, with a small decline in the ﬁnal years. The change in the
wedge accounts for about one-third of the ﬂuctuation of the equilibrium unemployment rate,
which is in line with the conclusion of Blanchard and Jimeno (1995) that ﬁscal policy cannot
explain differences in the unemployment rate between Spain and Portugal. It contrasts, however,
with the observation by Estrada et al. (2000), who estimate that workers are able to transmit 50%
of direct tax changes to labour costs. In my framework this would yield a much larger wedge
effect on the equilibrium unemployment rate. Remarkably, in the United Kingdom the decline in
the unemployment rate in the nineties did not stem from a reduction in the equilibrium level; in
fact, the equilibrium unemployment rate has risen.9
A common observation from the graphs of the equilibrium unemployment rates for the ﬁve
European economies is that they ﬂuctuate strongly and depend signiﬁcantly on policy measures
like the wedge and the replacement rate. Policymakers might therefore reduce the equilibrium
unemployment rate (towards which the actual unemployment rate moves) by reducing taxes and
beneﬁts.
A second similarity between the graphs of the ﬁve countries is that their rate of
unemployment was modest until about 1975, but increased signiﬁcantly thereafter. In the period
1980 -1985 the unemployment rate reached a (local) maximum in all countries. The picture for
the 1985 -1995 period is less uniform. The unemployment rate declined signiﬁcantly in the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, but remained high in France, Germany and Spain. For the
equilibrium unemployment rate, a similar story can be told: essentially the same pattern until
8 The strong dependence of the equilibrium unemployment rate on the replacement rate mimics the results of Broer et al.
(2000), but contrasts with the conclusion of Dur (2001), who points to the supply of labour as a key determinant of
unemployment.
9 The persistently high level of equilibrium unemployment was also observed by Nickell (1997), who identiﬁed ‘the
systematic shift in demand against the unskilled’ (p23) as the main cause. It contrasts with the conclusion by Henry et al.
(2000), who argue that the equilibrium unemployment rate in the UK has been reasonably stable through time.
221985 and divergence after that. In all countries, the upswing in the equilibrium unemployment
rate in the period 1980-1985 has been induced by rising capital costs.10 In addition, stabilisation
of the equilibrium unemployment rate afterwards can be linked to the stabilisation of capital
costs, excepting the Netherlands, where the equilibrium unemployment rate declined due to the
reduction in the replacement rate. In the other countries, the equilibrium rate of unemployment
hardly depends on the replacement rate. This conﬁrms the conclusion of Bean (1994) that an
exogenous increase in the generosity of beneﬁts does not seem to have been a prime factor
causing the rise in unemployment.
10 The inﬂuence of capital costs differs across countries for two reasons. First, the crucial parameter measuring the
impact of capital costs on equilibrium unemployment, the substitution elasticity, differs across countries. Second, the
relative cost of capital is measured in efﬁciency units, which implies that it depends on the estimate of technical growth,
which is approximated by γ 1t+γ 2t2.
234 Conclusions
We have used a structural approach to estimate equilibrium unemployment rates for several
European economies. In this approach, the estimation of equations for the wage rate and
employment are crucial. The estimates of both equations are reliable for the European
economies in the sample (France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom),
but the wage-level equation does not satisfactorily represent the data for the United States. This
can be explained by the low level of union coverage in the United States, in contrast to the
European economies.
The equilibrium unemployment rates calculated from these equations closely follow the
actual unemployment rate. Fluctuations in the actual unemployment rate can therefore be
explained largely by ﬂuctuations in the equilibrium rate. The equilibrium unemployment rates in
the European economies depend on policy variables like the wedge, the replacement rate and the
statutory minimum wage and, in addition on capital costs. However, the relation between
equilibrium unemployment and its determinants varies signiﬁcantly across countries. In some
countries, like the Netherlands, the replacement rate inﬂuences the equilibrium unemployment
rate signiﬁcantly. In other countries, like Germany, the wedge plays a major role. This implies
that uniﬁcation of ﬁscal policy would not lead to uniform unemployment rates in equilibrium.
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28Appendix A Derivation of the wage equation
The generalised Nash product of the wage negotiations can be written from equations (2.1) and
(2.2) as:
argmax(wi) :

pyy − lwi
pc
 
wi(1+te)−1(1 − td)
pc
− F
α
, (A.1)
F = p q wc + p (1−q)
wmin(1+te)−1(1 − td)
pc
+ (1− p)

ρ wc + γ
w
py
,

where F is the fallback position of workers and α is the relative bargaining power of workers.
The surplus of ﬁrms is normalised by deﬂation with the consumer price index. The subscript i is
added to the wage rate to indicate the difference between wages that can be varied in the
negotiations and the average wage rate. In equilibrium wi=w holds. The ﬁrst-order condition of
(A.1) with respect to wi is:
w
py
=
α
1 − F/wc + α
h , wc ≡
w(1+te)−1(1 − td)
pc
, (A.2)
where wi=w is imposed. Use the deﬁnition of the fallback position of workers in equation (A.1)
to rewrite F/wc as:
F/wc = p q + p (1−q)
wmin
w
+ (1− p) [ρ + γ L]. (A.3)
Use this equation and the fact that p is a function of u, with p’(u)<0. Then equation (A.2) can be
linearized to equation (2.3) in the text.
29Appendix B Data
Annual data for wages, prices, output, employment and unemployment is taken from the
AMECO-database. For Germany, we have combined this data with data from DIW, Berlin. From
the AMECO database we also used the indirect tax and social security series for the Netherlands.
The tax and premium series for Germany have been constructed by DIW; for France, Spain and
the United Kingdom, these series were provided by OFCE, Paris. This institute also constructed
the replacement series for France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom and the minimum
wage rate (in real terms) for France. For the Netherlands, we used the CPB series for the
replacement rate. The Spanish minimum wage rate was taken from the Eurostat database. The
wage rate is deﬁned as the compensation of employees per head.
Table B.1 shows the unit-root (Dickey-Fuller) test for the real wage rate w/py, labour
productivity h, the wedge L, the replacement rate ρ, the minimum wage rate deﬂated by the
consumer price index wmin/pc, and the unemployment rate u. The table show that most series
include a unit root at the 5%-signiﬁcance level. The exceptions are the real wage rate in Germany
and France, labour productivity in Spain and the minimum wage rate in France and Spain, where
the unit-root test is unable to distinguish between a stochastic and deterministic trend.
Table B.1 Unit root test
ln( w
py ) lnh lnL lnRR ln(
wmin
pc ) u
Level
France − 2.83 − 2.38 − 0.13 − 0.74 − 4.56 − 1.41
Germany − 2.95 − 1.29 − 2.21 − 1.73 − 1.68
Netherlands − 2.43 − 1.93 − 1.60 − 0.48 − 2.28
Spain − 1.48 − 2.92 − 2.19 − 2.96 − 1.96
United Kingdom − 1.48 − 1.34 − 0.76 − 0.21 − 1.38
United States 0.23 0.97 − 0.46 − 1.63
First difference
France − 2.05 − 4.34 − 4.55 − 4.76 − 4.16 − 3.65
Germany − 2.39 − 3.84 − 4.51 − 3.72 − 2.82
Netherlands − 3.05 − 4.76 − 4.99 − 3.43 − 3.46
Spain − 2.70 − 3.16 − 3.98 − 3.40 − 2.86
United Kingdom − 4.05 − 4.03 − 3.58 − 6.26 − 3.15
United States − 3.99 − 4.70 − 5.32 − 4.15
We report the Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic including a constant and up to 2 lags. Samples: see Table 3.1. The 5% critical value is
-2.86.
30Appendix C Additional estimates
The coefﬁcients on labour productivity and product prices in the estimation of the wage
equations in Table 3.1 and the coefﬁcient of output in the estimation of the labour demand
equation in Table 3.3 were restricted to unity. In this section of the appendix we test these
restrictions using the Wald-test, or Likelihood Ratio (LR) test, with the results reported in Table
C.1. The restriction of the labour-productivity coefﬁcient to unity has to be rejected for France,
Spain and the United States. However, the estimated coefﬁcient for Spain is reasonably close to
unity, and the restriction to unity does not importantly affect the estimated coefﬁcients for the
unemployment rate, for the wedge and for the minimum wage rate. The restricted equations are
therefore still considered to be good representations of the wage determination. The same cannot
be argued for France and the United States. The estimated coefﬁcient for France is well below
one, whereas the restriction of the labour productivity coefﬁcient in the US to unity yields
trended residuals. The Wald-test rejects the restriction of the unit coefﬁcient of the output price
for the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, though the coefﬁcients are quite
close to unity. Finally, the unit restriction of the output coefﬁcient in the labour demand equation
was not rejected by the data at the 5% signiﬁcance level, with the exception of Germany.
Table C.1 Test on unit coefﬁcients for labour productivity and GDP-deﬂator in the wage equation and output in
the employment equation
w : y/l w : py l : y
Coefﬁcient LR-test Coefﬁcient LR-test Coefﬁcient LR-test
France 0.55 28.26 1.02 0.06 0.93 2.52
Germany 1.02 0.14 1.03 0.56 0.77 7.38
The Netherlands 1.13 4.46 1.06 8.00 0.89 1.20
Spain 1.12 7.92 1.03 4.80 1.07 0.82
United Kingdom 0.95 1.08 1.05 7.16 0.79 3.80
United States 0.83 61.50 0.96 45.66 0.93 1.80
The table shows the unrestricted estimations of labour productivity (w : y/l) and GDP-prices (w : py) in the wage equation and output in
the labour demand equation (l : y). The restrictions are tested with the Likelihood Ratio statistic (Wald test), which is distributed as a χ2
distribution with 1 degree of freedom. The critical values of this distribution are: 2.71 (10%), 3.84 (5%) and 6.63 (1%) for the signiﬁcance
levels in brackets.
C.1 Dynamic wage and labour demand equations
We have estimated error-correction equations for the growth of wages and employment. The
error-correction equations are speciﬁed as:
Dx = ξ x Dx−1 + ξ y
0 Dy + ξ y
1 Dy−i + ξ ec(x − x∗)−1, x = w,l (C.1)
31where x denotes the log of wages or employment, y are several exogenous variables, and x∗ is
the long-run value of the wage rate, or the employment level. Exogenous variables and lagged
endogenous variables have been excluded from the equations if they are insigniﬁcant. In the
estimations, we take the long-run equations, as shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.3, as given.
Table C.2 Dynamic wage equation
DwF = 1.38Dpy + 0.39D(y/l) + 0.42Dw−1 − 0.72Dpy.−1 − 0.34(w−1−w∗
−1)
se(EC) = 0.12 R2 = 0.98 DW = 2.47
DwG = 1.51Dpy + 0.63D(y/l) + 0.31D(y/l)−1 − 0.65Du−1 − 0.02 − 0.21(w−1−w∗
−1)
se(EC) = 0.15 R2 = 0.95 DW = 1.91
DwNL = 0.76Dpy + 0.64Dw−1 − 0.32Dpy.−1 − 0.49(w−1−w∗
−1)
se(EC) = 0.14 R2 = 0.95 DW = 1.49
DwS = 0.40Dpy + 0.68D(y/l) + 0.52Dwmin − 0.81(w−1−w∗
−1)
se(EC) = 0.19 R2 = 0.97 DW = 1.82
DwUK = 1.11Dpy + 0.76D(y/l) + 0.46Dw−1 − 0.60Dpy.−1 − 0.46D(y/l)−1 − 0.64(w−1−w∗
−1)
se(EC) = 0.18 R2 = 0.96 DW = 2.19
DwUS = 0.66Dpy + 0.44D(y/l) + 0.47Dw−1 − 0.01 − 0.26(w−1−w∗
−1)
se(EC) = 0.12 R2 = 0.90 DW = 2.15
w∗ is the equilibrium wage rate, calculated from equation (3) with the estimated parameters of Table 3.1. 4w = w −w−1 is the absolute
change of the wage rate. The second row of each equation presents the standard errors (se) of the error-correction parameters, the sum
of squares of the residuals (R2) and the Durbin-Watson statistic.
The dynamic wage equation is estimated for France (F), Germany (G), the Netherlands (N), Spain (S), the United Kingdom (UK) and the
United States (US).
The dynamic wage equations for France (F), Germany (G), the Netherlands (NL), Spain (S),
the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) are shown in Table C.2. The long-run
equations can be considered as equilibrium relations because wage growth depends negatively
on the difference between the actual and equilibrium wage rate. However, the standard error of
the error-correction parameter is for some countries, like Germany and the United States, rather
large.1
The adjustment speed towards equilibrium is rather large for Spain and the United Kingdom,
moderate for France and the Netherlands, and quite small for Germany. Given the weak ﬁt of the
wage-level equation for the United States, it is remarkable that it enters the dynamic wage
equation signiﬁcantly. The reason is that the trend in the long-run residuals has been set off by
the trends in the growth rates of wages, prices and labour productivity.
1 The t-values of the error-correction term for Germany and the United States are about 2. The critical values of testing
αEC=0, are generally larger than 3. Critical values for equations including dummies might differ from those reported in that
paper.
32In all countries, wages respond immediately and positively to changes in the output price and
labour productivity, where the price response often exceeds unity. In Spain, wage growth is
rather sensitive to changes in the minimum wage rate.
Table C.3 Dynamic labour demand equation
DlF = 0.49Dy − 0.14D(w/py) + 0.46Dl−1 − 0.14Dy−1 − 0.003 − 0.19(l−1−l∗
−1)
se(EC) = 0.07 R2 = 0.84 DW = 2.17
DlG = 0.53Dy − 0.26D(w/py) + 0.46Dl−1 − 0.01 − 0.33(l−1−l∗
−1)
se(EC) = 0.10 R2 = 0.92 DW = 1.29
DlNL = 0.44Dy − 0.25D(w/py) + 0.60Dl−1 − 0.003 − 0.44(l−1−l∗
−1)
se(EC) = 0.08 R2 = 0.86 DW = 2.27
DlS = 0.62Dy − 0.32D(w/py) + 0.49Dl−1 − 0.01 − 0.37(l−1−l∗
−1)
se(EC) = 0.15 R2 = 0.84 DW = 1.93
DlUK = 0.36Dy − 0.38D(w/py) + 0.22Dl−1 − 0.001 − 0.55(l−1−l∗
−1)
se(EC) = 0.09 R2 = 0.89 DW = 2.21
DlUS = 0.63Dy − 0.48D(w/py) + 0.19Dy−1 − 0.002 − 0.45(l−1−l∗
−1)
se(EC) = 0.16 R2 = 0.93 DW = 1.95
l∗ is the equilibrium employment level, calculated from equation (2.5) with the estimated parameters of Table 3.3. 4l = l −l−1 is the
absolute change of the wage rate. The second row of each equation presents the standard errors (se) of the error-correction parameters,
the sum of squares of the residuals (R2) and the Durbin-Watson statistic.
The dynamic wage equation is estimated for France (F), Germany (G), the Netherlands (N), Spain (S), the United Kingdom (UK) and the
United States (US).
The dynamic labour demand equations for the six countries are shown in Table C.3. The
long-run equations can be considered as equilibrium relations because employment growth
depends negatively on the difference between the actual and equilibrium levels of employment.
The response of employment to deviations from the equilibrium is fast in the United Kingdom,
whereas the other labour markets are less ﬂexible. The positive coefﬁcients for output in the six
equations imply that higher output growth stimulates employment growth. In contrast, an
increase in the growth rate of real wages induces a reduction in employment growth, where this
effect is particularly strong in the United States. Finally, the combination of a low value of the
error-correction parameter and a high value of the parameter on lagged employment point to
high persistence in employment growth in countries like Germany and France. In contrast,
employment in the United Kingdom and the United States is much less persistent, which
indicates that labour markets in the Anglo-Saxon countries are more ﬂexible than the other
labour markets.
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